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Article

Huebner’s Critical Encounter with the
Philosophy of Heidegger in Being and
Time: Learning, Understanding, and
the Authentic Unfolding of
History in the Curriculum
James M. Magrini
Abstract: This paper responds to the following question: “What are the
issues concerned with potential educational reform that arise from
Huebner’s critical encounter with Heidegger and the tradition in
education and curriculum theory?” In attempting a rejoinder, I revisit
Huebner’s groundbreaking essay, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s
Temporality,” which introduces the phenomenological method in
education and curriculum studies, with the goal of examining in detail
the underlying themes, issues, and concepts, which ground Huebner’s
reconceptualization of curriculum reform, as they emerge from
Heidegger’s philosophy. I show that Huebner’s understanding of Beingin-the-world in terms of the design of the educational environment, not
only mirrors, but as well, embodies the flux, flow, and rhythmic
dynamics of history’s “dialectic” unfolding as a temporal phenomenon,
which for Heidegger represents our authentic “historizing” in the
“moment of vision,” or Augenblick, and this for Heidegger is the
definitive embodiment of Dasein’s authentic mode of existence as
historical Being-in-the-world as Being-with Others.
Key words: Heidegger, Dwayne Huebner, phenomenology, philosophy
of education

T

his essay engages in a close reading of the concepts that Dwayne
Huebner originally adopted for inclusion in his curriculum philosophy
by examining the essay, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s
Temporality,”1 focusing on the sources that emerge directly from Heidegger’s
philosophy, including the phenomenological-fundamental-ontology of Dasein

1 Pinar writes of the essay in the following manner when outlining the history of
phenomenology in curriculum studies: “Dwayne Huebner introduced phenomenology to
curriculum studies in the 1960s. Perhaps his ‘Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,’
read to the 1967 Ohio State University Curriculum Theory Conference and printed in Theory into
Practice, can be acknowledged as the specific event.” William Pinar, “History of Phenomenology
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as it is presented in Being and Time, which will then be related back to Huebner’s
work through hermeneutic exegesis and critique. Three sections form this
essay: (1) Huebner’s critique of learning and knowledge within “traditionalist”
and “concept-empiricist” curriculum ideology along with outlining a view of
the human and world these aforementioned curriculum movements adopt in
terms of Cartesian dualism; (2) The interpretation of ecstatic temporality as it
emerges from Heidegger’s thought and is assimilated by Huebner into the
philosophy of curriculum with the purpose of identifying the deleterious
effects the inauthentic notion of time, as a linear phenomenon, has on the
education of students; and (3) The critical analysis of authentic learning and
curriculum design, which is related to the unfolding of what Huebner terms the
“individual-world dialectic,” which consists of understanding and interpreting
the world in terms of a referential totality directed toward the student’s
ownmost potentiality-for-Being as a member of a learning community, i.e., her
authentic historical Being-in-the-world as Being-with others (historicity).2 I conclude
each section with thoughts on the potential implication these ideas might have
for the present and future conception of our educational practices. Ultimately,
I attempt to formalize the role Heidegger’s philosophy plays in inspiring
Huebner’s authentic reconceived understanding of curriculum and the human
being along with the potential impact this philosophy has for a reinterpretation
and reevaluation of our conceptions of knowledge, students, and learning in
education.
Since this essay engages in philosophical archeology, concerned as it is
with elucidating origins, it must be noted that any philosophy of education
inspired by Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Being and Time requires
clarification and justification at the outset. This is because the issue of
metaphysics as related to contemporary democratic education continues to be
heatedly debated in the philosophy of education. We must ask: Will the
attempted appropriation of Heidegger’s philosophy for the purpose of
contemporary educational reform betray the original metaphysical project of
Heidegger? Although a variety of responses have been offered by scholars,
with some drawing decidedly pessimistic conclusions, I argue that it is not only
possible to find value in Heidegger’s thought of 1927 and early 1930s, it is
possible to do so in manner that remains true to the development of his
metaphysical philosophy during that historical period. 3 For in 1933, within the
Rectoral Address delivered at Freiburg University, The Self-Assertion of the
German University, Heidegger embraces the potential of metaphysics for
in Curriculum Studies,” in Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text
(London: Routledge, 1992), 235.
2 Huebner uses the term “historicity” as opposed to “historicality” in his essay, and
this usage is consistent with Stambough’s (1996) translation of Being and Time. Macquarrie and
Robinson, however, use the term ‘historicality’. Since I incorporate the Macquarrie and Robinson
translation throughout, I use the term “historicality” when referring to Dasein’s authentic
process of historizing as Being-in-the-world as Being-with others.
3 James Magrini, “Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heidegger, Technology, and the
Poietic Attunement of Literature,” in Educational Philosophy and Theory (forthcoming 2012), 1-22.
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inspiring a sweeping reform of the system of higher education in Germany.
Indeed, education at this time for Heidegger represents a distinctly and
thoroughgoing metaphysical project. It is possible to marshal a defense of this
claim by attending to the commentaries of Wolin and Lowith, both of whom,
although disagreeing on the exact political implications of this document,
identify the common metaphysical-ontological ground in Heidegger’s
philosophy of education during the early and mid-1930s.
As Wolin writes, Heidegger’s conception of education, as expressed in
the Rectoral Address and other political writings of the 1930s, should be read
as advancing “the existential analytic of Being and Time”4 in terms of the
ontological-existential structures of Being-towards-death, destiny, ecstatic
temporality, and the authentic notion of freely choosing to choose oneself and
community amid possibilities that are at once given and inherited. Heidegger
conceives the entire reformation of higher education in Germany in terms of
an urgent spiritual and intellectual mission. Education, as a mode of selfassertion, must above all else draw its transcendent power from the “essence of
science (Wissenschaft) in its innermost necessity […] and through science,
educators and disciplines of those leaders and guardians of the fate”5 hold the
promise of inspiring the authentic historizing of Dasein. Wissenschaft, as
employed by Heidegger in the address, contrary to the common rendering of
this German term as science, or knowledge through natural science, as stated
by translator William C. Lewis, is a “central motif in his important texts from
1929 to 1935”6 and conceived by Heidegger as a special form of philosophical
insight within which the “Seinsfrage (the question of Being) occupies its rightful
pride of place.”7 Wissenschaft as thus defined is properly understood as both
spiritual and intellectual, in terms of the special sense of a “knowing resolve
[wissende Entschlossenheit] toward the essence of Being.”8
According to Heidegger, the essence of Wissenschaft, which emerges
from the concern with Being, is accompanied, and indeed preceded, by a mode
of attunement that inspires Dasein’s “unsheltered standing firm in the amidst of the
uncertainty of the totality of being, which alone might result in an authentically
transformed spiritual world.”9 Heidegger’s inquiry into the essence of education
is thus grounded in the philosophical potential of our “being gripped, which must
determine and attune us”10 for our ontological-historical vocation, through
which we are first able to grasp and formulate the philosophical question of
Being, and this for Heidegger occurs through the “the fundamental attunement of

4 Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1998), 26.
5 Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” in The Heidegger
Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 30.
6 William C. Lewis, (translator’s note) The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, 30.
7 Ibid., 30.
8 Carl Lowith, “The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism,” in ibid., 177.
9 Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” 33.
10 Ibid., 33.
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philosophizing.”11 Heidegger is clear that in order for the system of higher
education to embrace Wissenschaft, or the philosophical understanding of our
ontological potential as humans, two things are necessary:
[F]irst, the teachers and students must each in their own
way be seized by the idea of science and remain seized by it.
At the same time however, this concept of science must
penetrate into and transform the basic forms in which the
teachers and students collectively pursue their respective
scholarly activities.12
As will be elucidated in this essay, in relation to what has been stated
above, it is possible to interpret and understand Huebner’s philosophy of
education (and curriculum), which is both phenomenological and ontological
in nature, as emerging from the very ground of metaphysics – specifically as
defined by Heidegger in the 1929-30 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics: “Metaphysics is a questioning in which we inquire into beings as a
whole, and inquire in such a way that in doing so we ourselves, the questioners,
are thereby [attuned and] also included in the question, placed into question.”13
Huebner’s Critique of Traditional Curriculum Theory:
Navigating the World of Present-at-Hand Entities
Huebner adopts the view that learning, taken as the organizing
component around which the curriculum turns is mistaken, for it is only one
component within an ensemble of unique and specific concerns that should
inform the school’s curricular vision. However, it must be noted that Huebner
is critical of the form of learning associated with social efficiency ideology, i.e.,
learning as a process of knowledge acquisition, linked with the current
“scientific” trend in curriculum that demonstrates a “dependence on
psychological language or the language of other behavioral scientists,”14 which
engenders the bias in curriculum philosophy favoring “positivistic thought.”15
In addition to being critical of those reducing learning to the study of metacognition, basic cognitive processes, and the transfer of knowledge to students
through ever-greater hyper-efficient strategies for processing information,
Huebner is also critical of curriculum design that privileges a single form of
knowledge linked with scientific thematizing, which is abstract, conceptual, and
serves the instrumental purpose of preparing the student for her life beyond
11 Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans.
by William McNeill (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1995), 9.
12 Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University, 36.
13 Heidegger, op cit., 12-13/9.
14 Dwayne Huebner, D. “Knowledge: An Instrument of Man,” in The Lure of the
Transcendent: Collected Essays By Dwayne E. Huebner (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1999), 225.
15 Ibid., 225.
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the institution. In opposition to this limited view, Huebner sees the advantage
in recognizing and embracing various forms of learning and knowledge in the
curriculum. Although Huebner links authentic knowledge with know-how, this is
not to say that it requires a “pragmatic or socially functional use,”16 rather he
views authentic learning in terms of student participation in social activities
within the classroom, which include getting along with others while engaged in
heuristic learning experiences that enable the student to “discover who he is
and what he may become.”17
It is possible to interpret Huebner’s authentic notion of learning,
which emerges within the context of the curriculum shaped by the unfolding of
the individual-world dialectic, functioning as the hub around which the reconceived notion of curriculum turns. Huebner’s authentic notion of learning,
as a process of understanding through interpretation and meaning-making,
situates the student within the world of the curriculum wherein the classroom
resembles the authentic world of Dasein as presented by Heidegger, i.e., a
referential totality, or system of assignments and references, that we share
intimately with others, which “lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that
belongs to involvements”18 to which “Dasein assigns itself,”19 thus making up “the
worldhood of the world.”20 Prior to analyzing Huebner’s authentic notion of
learning, it is best to unpack his critique of the epistemological-ontological
views of both traditional curriculum-making (e. g., the Tyler rationale) and
curriculum making in terms of concept empiricism, highlighted by emerging
scientism, as the means by which to determine authentic student learning (e.g.,
Darling-Hammond, et al). Huebner’s general critique of learning in education is
two-fold and can be traced to both Heidegger’s early phenomenological
ontology of Dasein and his later philosophy relating to technology, poetic
human dwelling, and the concern with authentic thinking as a meditative
emersion in Being, and focuses on (1) the notion that all authentic learning
might be reduced to knowledge in the form of abstract conceptualization, or
scientific thematizing - calculative thought as described by Heidegger – valued for
its use in manipulating and mastering objective, empirical reality, which is a
view to knowledge grounded in (2) the Cartesian understanding of the human
as an interiorized subject who resides at a metaphysical and epistemological
remove from the objective world.
According to Huebner, within education “the language with the
greatest acceptance today are those governed by or are imitations of science.” 21
When learning is the focus of the curriculum within education philosophies
16 Dwayne Hubner, “Curriculum as a Concern for Man’s Temporality,” in The Lure of
the Transcendent: Collected Essays By Dwayne E. Huebner, 140.
17 Ibid., 140.
18 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York,
NY: Harper & Row, 1962), 119/86.
19 Ibid., 119/86.
20 Ibid., 119/86.
21 Dwayne Huebner, “New Modes of Man’s Relation to Man,” in The Lure of the
Transcendent: Collected Essays By Dwayne E, Huebner, 23.
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embracing scientific instrumentalism, it is primarily understood in terms of
“abstraction and generalization.”22 Educational models emerging from social
efficiency ideology view authentic learning in terms of the student’s ability to
abstract “certain patterns of events from a specific situation or a series of like
situations and transferring them to new situations.”23 This form of knowledge,
according to Huebner, arises from the “imposition of a symbolic curtain or
screen between the person or reality,”24 and knowledge of the world in this
form, by means of abstract symbols and images, appears to give the human
“more power in his encounter with and exploration of reality.”25 This
represents for Heidegger the negative aspects associated with the privileging of
scientific, or calculative knowledge, within our various modes of worlddisclosure, and as expressed by Young, “the more completely the world can be
‘calculated’ the more completely it can be controlled,”26 and thus “far from
being concerned to disclose the world in its ‘ownness,’ science is just another
disclosure of it in the ‘work’ – suitable way, another disclosure of it as
resource.”27 It is possible to understand the essence of Huebner’s critique of
curriculum, learning, and knowledge by attending to what Heidegger states
regarding the general relatedness of our thought to the sciences, which is
determined by the “basic trait of the modern era,” namely, “that objectmateriality which is established and maintained in power by the scientific
objectification in all fields.”28
For Heidegger, this specific type of world-disclosure functions by way
of objectifying and thematizing the world. As Heidegger indicates, when we
approach entities in the world in terms of representing abstract scientificmathematical relationships, we reduce them to a mere present-at-hand existence,
or as Heidegger states, “Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more,”29 and such
entities have their “properties defined mathematically in ‘functional
concepts’.”30 The implication of this for Huebner’s analysis of education is
expressed succinctly in Dreyfus’ account of Heidegger’s notion of thematizing,
wherein Dreyfus concludes that one problem with this view of knowledge is
that
once characteristics are no longer related to one another
in a concrete, everyday, meaningful way, as aspects of a
Dwayne Hubner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 135.
Ibid., 135.
24 Huebner, “New Modes of Man’s Relation to Man,” 23.
25 Dwayne Huebner, “Towards a Remaking of Curriculum Language,” in Heightened
Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing
Corporation, 1974), 38.
26 Julian Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 77.
27 Ibid., 77.
28 Martin Heidegger,(1968) What is Called Thinking?, trans. by J. G. Gray, F. Wiecks
(New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1968), 102.
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 122/88.
30 Ibid., 122/88.
22
23
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thing in a particular context, the isolated properties that
remain can be quantified and related by scientific laws
and thus taken as evidence for theoretical entities.31
Thus, we approach entities by means of knowledge in a way that
stands beyond our authentic engagement with their Being, and the so-called
“bare facts” of science isolate phenomena through the “special activity of
selective seeing,” and thus in a duplicitous sense, “scientifically relevant ‘facts’
are not merely removed from their context by selective seeing; they are theoryladen, i.e., recontextualized in a new projection.”32 When thematizing entities
through scientific world-disclosure, as Heidegger points out, they are freed in
order that we might “determine their character objectively, which means that
we free them “in such a way that they can ‘throw themselves against’ a pure
discovering – that is, that they can become “Objects’.”33 The production,
through abstracted thought, of “isolated properties with no contextual
meaning”34 provides us with a new, but “essentially meaningless, context for
[present-at-hand] properties.”35 If education concerns itself primarily with a
mode of learning that thematizes the content of its curriculum, and beyond, the
understanding of the human being and its world, along with the things and
subjects with which it deals, then it is sanctioning a form of knowing that gives
rise to a limited understanding of things because it privileges a mode of
disclosure that ignores the complexity and particularity of our practical and
meaningful interaction with the world and those with whom we share it. As
Huebner argues, when we approach the world and others “enclosed in the
framework of the subject-object attitude,”36 we tend to view others as
“essentially predictable, controllable,”37 as something to be “studied and
known.”38 Learning grounded in abstract conceptualization, which is
emphasized and favored by traditional curricular theorists and the conceptempiricists in education, removes students from the context of their involved
dwelling with others and obscures, or covers over, their individuality and
Being. Against this view, Huebner argues that we should not seek to encounter
others “in terms of abstractions and concepts,”39 rather we should meet and
commune with others through face-to-face discourse.
Inauthentic education is neither interactive nor generative, and is
conceived by Huebner as acting upon the student who in turn learns, or is
trained, to act upon the world because he has assimilated it in knowledge, and
31 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division
I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 81.
32 Ibid., 81.
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, 414/363.
34 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, 81.
35 Ibid., 81.
36 Dwayne Huebner, “The Task of the Curricular Theorist,” in The Lure of the
Transcendent: Collected Essays By Dwayne E, Huebner, 88.
37 Ibid., 88.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 89.
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this “leads to the proposition that there is the individual and there is a world,
and that the individual develops in such a way that he has power over the
world or to act upon the world.”40 Huebner’s critique of concept-empiricism
sets up a world picture that is Cartesian in nature, or dualistic, which Heidegger
refers to as the impoverished Cartesian world, which is sharply contrasted by
Heidegger with the world in its ontological-existential manifestation that is
linked with the worldhood of Dasein. The Cartesian “world” is meant as an
“ontical concept and signifies the totality of those entities which can be
present-at-hand within the world”41 as objects situated in time-space. In this
view we are subjects merely observing the world objectively and dispassionately
refraining from interfering with the sense data we are receiving from the world
for fear that our perceptions might lead to a distorted and inaccurate picture of
reality. Legitimate knowledge is constructed from our ideas in an atomistic
manner by means of establishing connections and relations between concepts
to form an accurate view of (objective) reality.
To view the world exclusively in this manner misses the crucial way in
which world “functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those
entities”42 with which educators and students are intimately involved.
Knowledge, in this view, is really an interior phenomenon occurring in the
closed consciousness of the individual. Ideas (representations) in the mind
appear to “picture” external reality, and when there is an agreement between
our mental representations and the objective world, it is said we have
knowledge. This indicates that when we know the objective world, because we
have systematized facts expressed through mathematical formulae or universal
laws of science, as previously stated, we act as subjects who impose our wills
(through knowledge) in order to command and manipulate the world. The
epistemological and ontological problem that this worldview engenders for
education revolves around the model for validating truth claims that it adopts,
namely, the correspondence model of truth, or epistemological model for verifying
knowledge, which is based on the logic of adaequatio intellectus et rei, or “the
adequation of the intellect and the thing.”43
Traditional Western philosophy, and by extension educational
philosophy rooted in social efficiency, erroneously claims that “the ‘locus’ of truth
is assertion (judgment),”44 and the “essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ of

Hubner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 136.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 93/64.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., (translator’s note), 257/214. The learning experiences that accompany the era
of standardized, “high stakes testing” in education represent instances where knowledge (and
learning) is reduced to the correspondence model of truth. The student’s subjective knowledge is linked
with the objective knowledge on the test in a way where it is determined to be either correct or
incorrect. To assess reading comprehension or literacy based on state mandated tests embracing
the Either/Or epistemological cluster, ignores any and all notions of hermeneutic and heuristic
forms of meaning-making as a valid indicators of higher-level student understanding through
knowledge construction and transfer.
44 Ibid., 257/214.
40
41
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the judgment with the object.”45 This misinterpretation of truth is prevalent
today because of the influence of the metaphysics of presence, which Heidegger
traces to the origins of ancient ontology, “the decisive period” when the “logos
functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically is,
and for deciding the Being of such entities.”46 The notion of thematizing
introduced earlier is precisely a way of “encountering entities in-the-world
purely in the way they look (eidos),”47 and looking at the world in this manner “is
sometimes a definite way of taking up a direction toward something – of
setting our sights toward what is [merely] present-at-hand.”48 Truth conceived
only in terms of agreement overlooks the more primordial phenomenon of
truth as occurrence, or happening, the moment when phenomena are first
disclosed to Dasein, for as Heidegger claims, “The most primordial phenomenon of
truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering.” 49 This for
Heidegger represents the Being of truth, as “Being-true,” which is aletheuein, or
movement into the opening of truth as aletheia – or privative expression
meaning “un-concoveredness”. Dasein is always “in truth” due to its
disclosedness in general, its projection towards its potentiality-for-Being, which
means that “Dasein can understand itself in terms of the ‘world’ and Others or
in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”50 Heidegger claims that we are
also in “untruth” due to falling, which is a component of Dasein’s Being that
opens it to potential deception, for even in disclosure, things can “show
themselves in the mode of semblance,” for there is always the possibility that
what has “formally been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised.”51
The notion of primordial truth as aletheia avoids Cartesian dualism as it
transcends objectivist-ontology by showing that there is no interior-exterior
divide between the human and its world, for truth is not conceived at a
physical-spatial remove from the human’s perspective, but rather a view to
truth as openness to the letting be of beings and Being. We might imagine
students and educators within the context of the world of their authentic
learning as participating within the clearing and lighting of truth, in the open
revelation of their potentiality-for-Being, or the unconcealment of beings,
Ibid., 257/214
Ibid., 196/154. In “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger details the decisive shift in
Western metaphysics when truth as aletheia was subjugated to truth as “agreement” in his
somewhat controversial reading of Plato’s allegory of the cave. See Fried for one such critical
account of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato and his metaphysical doctrine of truth: “Of
course, Heidegger means by ‘doctrine’ (Lehre) ‘that which, within what is said, remains unsaid,’
rather than a self-conscious teaching of the thinker: in Plato’s cave, this is the transition of truth
as aletheia from unconcealment (Unverborgenheir) to the correctness of representation […] many
postmodernists who owe a debt of thinking to Heidegger have also accepted this reading of
Plato […] But such a Plato is not the only Plato.” Greg Fried, “Back to the Cave: A Platonic
Rejoinder to Heideggerian Postmodernism,” in Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 157.
47 Ibid., 196/154.
48 Ibid., 88/61.
49 Ibid., 264/221
50 Ibid., 264/221.
51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 264/222.
45
46
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which is never reducible to an existent state, for it is a happening, or occurrence.
Truth as unconcealedness, as primordial aletheia, “is neither an attribute of
factual things in the sense of beings, nor one of propositions.”52 In the midst
of truth’s happening, “in the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs,
There is a clearing, a lighting,”53 and by means of this open clearing aletheia
“grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we
ourselves are not, and access to the being that we are ourselves are.”54 Truth as
aletheia in fact makes possible truth as agreement, it is the primordial “condition
of the possibility”55 of truth as correspondence. The understanding of truth as
an original event presupposes that we are always already situated in the world,
immersed within our existence. This dramatically influences the manner in
which we understand and discourse about the world and others. To let the
world be seen in its “unhiddenness” means that we let the world come to
presence in the mode of its own self-showing, in ways that are meaningful to
us.
Huebner’s critique of learning in social efficiency ideology is linked directly
to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Cartesian world of objects, for if we are
perceiving the classroom in such impoverished terms, focusing only on the
objective features of the things we deal with, their present-at-hand attributes, their
abiding presence, educators are missing the fact that things and people always
reveal themselves in a larger context, within a context of meaningful relations,
which cannot be reduced to the knowledge of things available to us by way of
thematizing the world. This represents a persistent problem for educators,
namely, the loss of meaningful educational experiences for students: To focus
on the ‘facts’ of our educational subject-matter, those aspects of curriculum
that can be efficiently mastered and demonstrated through rigorous forms of
examination, pays no heed to how the content is meaningful to the student’s
Being or her world. The notion of authentic meaning in constructivist terms
will be explored in the final section of the essay, for it underlies Huebner’s
understanding of authentic learning, which is grounded in the human being’s
authentic relation to its world. As Huebner suggests:
The individual is not separated from the world, or apart
from it – he is a part of it […] if a curricular language can
be developed so that the educator looks at the individual
or the situation together, not separately, then his powers
of curricular design and educational responsibility might
be increased.56

52 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by A. Hofstadter (London: Harper
& Row, 1971), 54.
53 Ibid., 54.
54 Ibid., 53.
55 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, 199
56 Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 136.
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Inauthentic learning is concerned with knowledge that is both
instrumental and of a distinct variety, namely, logical-rational-scientific, and
education that lives in the shadow of positivism runs the ever-present risk of
degenerating into a form of curriculum-making where technicalization and
hyperrationalization dominate. The former focuses on the utility of our
knowledge at the exclusion of the concern for meanings, for why we do things
and why they are meaningful to us; the latter, favors the application of reason
alone to our analyses of the world at the exclusion of the concern for the
emotional and spiritual dimensions of our Being. Education in this view is
reduced to students navigating the world of present-at-hand entities with the goal
of mastering and controlling the environment and the things therein by means
of the power they gain through acquiring objective knowledge. Not that
educators should avoid experiences that focus on the empirically verifiable
aspects of reality, but this form of learning-knowledge should not be privileged
above all other ways of knowing, understanding, and intuiting the crucial
dimensions of the student’s Being. Hermeneutic interpretive meaning-making
should be an integral part of the learning experience in the classroom and
educators should demonstrate a genuine concern for the general intangible
aspects of the learner’s Being-in-the-world, which cannot be quantifiably measured
or validated by means of the traditional epistemological model grounded in the
differentiation between a priori-analytic and a posteriori-synthetic.
Inauthentic learning situates the source of knowledge outside of the
learner in the objective world. The types of inauthentic learning experiences
that accompany the era of standardized, or “high-stakes testing,” in education
are instances where objective knowledge is situated at a remove from the
student, is then imparted to the student, for which the student is then
responsible for identifying and recognizing on the test. If the student’s
(subjective) knowledge is linked correctly with the objective knowledge on the
test, she demonstrates knowledge. To assess reading comprehension or
contribute to the determination of literacy based on a test privileging the
Either/Or epistemological cluster (by means of employing the correspondence
model of truth), ignores constructivist knowledge, or understanding, emerging
from hermeneutic interpretation and meaning-making as strong indicators of
higher-level understanding. This misses the more primordial aspects of learning
through interpretive activities as process of uncovering Being, which is
associated with the primordial revelation of truth, or the making-present of
truth, as aletheia.
Authentic education organizes learning experiences so as to encourage
students to inhabit and interact with the world of the classroom in terms of
being “open” to the world they encounter within the various activities that
comprise their learning experience. Students should be encouraged to allow
things to come to presence in truth, in the very light of their own self-showing,
and most importantly, in ways that matter to them, in ways that have meaning
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for their Being. Educators should resolutely pursue the formation of students
by letting them be, as it were, allowing their unique possibilities for Being to shine
forth. The essence of truth, and hence knowledge and understanding, should
not be thought of as residing in propositions, formulae, standardized tests, or
other such vehicles for packaging, transmitting, and assessing the validity of
truth, all of which express the correspondence between the internal
representation (idea) of the subject and the existing (real) objective state-ofaffairs. Rather the essential way in which we are “in-truth” occurs through
disclosure, as we are “there” in moments of authentic discovery, which is the
occurrence of both students and educators actively uncovering their authentic
possibilities as related to their Being within the authentic context of navigating
solutions to the problems they encounter.
Huebner, Heidegger, and Ecstatic Temporality
There is yet a third aspect of Huebner’s critique of education emerging
from his focus on objectivist-ontology and the epistemological reliance on
logical-rational-scientific knowledge as the gold standard for learning, and that is
his concern with transcending the inauthentic notion of temporality that
accompanies these aforementioned educational philosophies, especially
prevalent within the erroneous view wherein knowledge is thought to map
both space and time. As Huebner points out, “Man abstracts from the
processes of life as if his only meanings were in the spatial world not
necessarily in the temporal,”57 and if this crucial issue is confused or ignored,
namely, the undeniable spatial characteristics of knowledge, the educator is in danger
of viewing and interacting with the world “as if it were relatively stable in
time,”58 i.e., in an a-temporal and a-historical manner. Due to the
misunderstanding of authentic temporality, contemporary curriculum
philosophy erroneously conflates education theory, which is practical, with
scientific theory, which describes, explains, and predicts, and so researchers
wrongly view educational programs as having a direct, observable, and
predictable application within classrooms. In distinction to this view, authentic
educational theory attempts to suggest what we ought to be doing in the
classroom, and as opposed to objective and disinterested, according to
Huebner, it is unabashedly subjective, value-laden, and emancipatory. Huebner,
taking up Heidegger’s interpretation of “ecstatic temporality,” claims that we
need to embrace the view of time in which we embody our past, as heritage,
and stand out in projection toward an indeterminate future, which returns to
meet us in the authentic present when our authentic possibilities are opened
for appropriation. Huebner’s authentic understanding of time in its relation to
curriculum studies challenges the vision, design, and implementation of the
curriculum in contemporary education, which is erroneously conceived in
terms of a linear understanding of time.
57
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Huebner links temporality with historicality in terms of Heidegger’s
understanding of Dasein’s authentic comportment in the moment of vision,
and thus a brief overview of the process of Dasein’s temporalizing, in addition to
a few words about time as conceived by Heidegger, will assist the
understanding of Huebner’s individual-world dialectic, which provides the design of
the classroom’s temporal-historical environment. Huebner’s strives to overcome
the erroneous conception of the student as an ahistorical subject situated
within a linear conception of time conceived as a series of “now” points,
unfolding in three the distinct moments of past, present and future. In this
view of time, as Heidegger argues, past and future are subordinated to the
present, the “nun [now] is the metron [measure] of past and future,”59 and as a
result “time is always interpreted as present, past is interpreted as no longer
present, future as independent not-yet-present.”60 Importantly, this leads to an
inauthentic view of our historical evolution and development, for in it the
dynamic unfolding of our authentic historizing is reduced to an inauthentic view
wherein history is conceived in terms of “historiography,” or the scientific
discipline that studies past events, cultures, and their artifacts.
According to Heidegger, history, as “historiography,” is concerned
with those things once present, now forever gone, and so the past is conceived
as belonging “irretrievably to another earlier time.”61 This idea is linked to the
understanding of human history in terms of a series of irretrievable events or
moments. This engenders an inauthentic understanding of the significance of
the past in relation to Dasein’s future and present, and arises as a result of its
falling and its absorption in the “They-self” and the everyday ways of
understanding its existence, and “allows what has passed to be only in the past,
which lets it freeze in the finality of [its] rigor mortis.”62 The interpretation of
time as a linear phenomenon covers over the ontological-existential
significance of Dasein’s death, birth, and heritage, as thrown having-been – it’s
authentic life. According to Heidegger, history happens in praxis in terms of
Dasein’s historicality, which is the living event of Daein’s freedom in relation
to its past in the projection of its authentic possibilities, which arise from its
past as heritage. Historicality, according to Huebner, as it relates specifically to
curriculum development in education, is associated with practice, and in his
view,
practice as human event suggests the essentially temporal
nature of man and points to the linkage of biography to
history as a major educational concern. Curriculuralists
have ignored such questions of destiny, finitude, and the

59 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. by William McNeill (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing. 1992), 17e.
60 Ibid., 17e.
61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 430/378.
62 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. by John Gray (New York, NY:
Harper & Row, 1968), 103.
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meaning of morality of the influence of one human being
on another. 63

Huebner argues that the traditionalists and concept-empiricists in
curriculum theory are either concerned with establishing goals, purposes, and
objectives, which orient learning exclusively toward the future, with the specific
task of determining the student’s “future behavior,” or they are locked within
the static moment of the present, which leads to the failure to understand the
potential for change and to realize that “human life is never fixed but is always
emergent as the past and future become horizons of the present.”64 Heidegger
traces the loss of Dasein’s authentic temporal Being to the inauthentic,
everyday interpretation of existence in which Dasein “temporalizes itself in the
mode of making-present,”65 and by locating itself in the hypostatized moment
of the present (or “now”), Dasein “loses his time”66 because it fails to await the
approach of the authentic future from out of its past, heritage, or having-been.
This also represents the loss of Being, which emerges from a misunderstanding
of Being as being present, i.e., the event of Being is conceived as “pure presence,
that is, the presence that persists, the abiding present, the steadily standing
‘now’.”67 This inauthentic interpretation of Being is linked inextricably with
temporality, and it erroneously views beings as standing outside of time, as
independent of time, and subsequently, this view of time “sees time in the
sense of a passing away.”68 Rather, an authentic temporal existence, states
Huebner, remaining close to Heidegger’s notion of ecstatic temporality as it is
linked with historicality, requires “inspection of the past (or the present as the
already-past),” 69 along with the “identification of forms of existence or aspects
of life considered worthy of maintenance, transmission, or necessary for
evolution; and the projection of these valued forms into the future.”70
Huebner expresses succinctly the inauthentic interpretation of time
when stating the following: “Man, has constructed his scientific view of time as
something objective and beyond himself, in which he lives.”71 Such a view is
opposed to the manner in which Heidegger views Dasein’s authentic
relationship to time, for as he states, “Dasein conceived in its most extreme
possibility of Being is time itself and not in time.”72 Time is not objective, for the
duration or length of time cannot be measured scientifically by way of
mathematical symbols, for time has no length. While mathematical-scientific
knowledge accurately measures the medium of space, it is powerless to
calculate, gauge, and represent the non-spatial medium of time, with its
Huebner, “Knowledge: An Instrument of Man,” 225.
Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 132-133.
65 Heidegger, Being and Time, 436/410.
66 Ibid.
67 Heidegger, What is called Thinking? 102.
68 Ibid., 103
69 Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 132.
70 Ibid., 137.
71 Ibid., 137.
72 Heidegger, Concept of Time, 14e.
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dynamic flux and flow. The future does not rush toward us as we stand in the
present moment, only to disappear forever into the irretrievable void of the
past. In addition, time is not linear, and neither the wall-cock nor wristwatch
properly presents time, and according to Heidegger, by treating time as a
quantitative phenomenon, measurable in length, in its extension, the clock
attempts to show us “what” time is, but misses the more substantial
ontological-existential matter of how time is, which is to say, the way in which we
enact our time when living as temporal, existential beings.
Our humanity, or ontological self-hood, is inextricably
grounded in ecstatic temporality, wherein past, present, and future are united,
indivisible, perpetually working in concert within the moment of our present.
This moment of the present is the authentic moment of vision, i.e., the
revelation of truth and subsequent appropriation of our authentic Being-in-theworld. It is not “present” in terms of a point that is situated between future
and past. It is the moment in which the world, beings, and entities reveal
themselves in ways that matter within the “there,” or disclosedness, of Dasein.
As Heidegger states, this moment of vision is possible due to the convergence
of past and future, and this suggests that the past circles round to meet us, “the
coming [Kunft] in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-being, comes
toward itself,”73 from out of the indeterminate future, and thus the past is
never legitimately gone. The fact that we have a past cannot be overlooked or
skirted, as it represents our being thrown into the world in a specific and
unique manner. However, the past acquires meaning only when we
authentically project it into the future, and when “authentically futural, Dasein
is authentically as ‘having-been,’ as its own thrown past.”74
Authenticity represents our “most extreme possibility of Being,” 75 it is a life
in praxis, a temporal process of taking over our existence through interpretive
decision-making, whereby we legitimize our thrown-past (having-been) in the
service of making (and re-making) our future Being. Dasein’s authentic
Selfhood is only to be found in the “authentic-potentiality-for-being-one’s-self
– that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s Being as care.”76 For Heidegger,
the “primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality”77 and this
relates to the Being of Dasein as “Care,” which embodies the three moments,
or horizons, of ecstatic temporality: (1) we are always out-ahead-of-ourselves in
the projection of a future, (2) we are always along side both things and Others
in the world, and (3) we are always already in the world as a thrown, living
being, as someone with a past, a history and heritage. When considering such a
model of temporality, of which “clock time” is merely derivative, it is crucial to
acknowledge that the past, which constitutes our living history and heritage, is
sewn into the very fabric of our Being. The past is continually at work
Heidegger, Being and Time, 373/326.
Ibid..
75 Heidegger, The Concept of Time, 10e.
76 Heidegger, Being and Time, 369/322.
77 Martin Heidegger The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. by Michael Heim
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 297.
73
74
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influencing and shaping the moment of vision through its ever-attendant
presence. The past serves as the source of our historical life and future; it allows
us to redefine our existence by making choices on the possibilities that emerge
from our heritage, which is at once the historical ground of our existence.
It is possible to grasp ecstatic temporality in the following manner: In the
moment of resolute openness (Entschlossenheit), the mood of Angst individuates
Dasein for its death and ownmost possibilities for Being, opening what
Heidegger terms, the “Situation,” or the authentic way of “Being-there”.
Conceived as a temporal phenomenon, the Situation is Dasein’s moment of
vision or instant of authenticity. “In the instant as an ecstases,” writes
Heidegger, “the existent Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into the factically
determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation of
action.”78 This is the authentic present of ecstatic temporality, when Dasein,
accessible and free, projects itself into its possibilities within the factical and
distinct circumstances of its own unique life. Such an authentic resolute
openness to worldly encounters is only possible because Dasein, as a temporal
being that temporalizes, is at once its future, past, and present as thrown-projecting
Being-in-the-world.
The present, which is held within authentic temporality, is the
sustaining form of Dasein’s authentic choices, representing the “resolute
rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and
circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of
concern.”79 The authentic temporalizing of Dasein occurs as it projects its finite
possibilities, which initiates a forward movement towards itself as resolute
Being-towards-death in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and this movement
secures a “repetition,” or authentic retrieval, of Dasein’s having-been. In
coming to or toward itself, from out of its indeterminate future, as engendered
by its own past, Dasein discloses the meaning of authentic Being within the
instant of the present, or moment of vision (Augenblick),80 of the Situation. This
ecstatic temporal process represents the letting be of Being, which represents the
authentic truth of existence. Thus, when Dasein exists authentically, it
experiences the world in its basic “uconcealment” – allowing that which shows itself
from itself to be seen – now not disclosing beings as present-at-hand entities, or
objects, but the phenomenon of world as such, the worldhood of the world, i.e.,
the overarching matrix of meaning and purpose structuring Dasein’s being-inthe-world, which understanding and interpretation have in great part made
possible for Dasein.81 The process of temporalizing, as described above, will be
Ibid., 297.
Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 287.
80 McNeill translates Augenblick as “the glance of the eye,” and prefers this translation
to moment, moment of vision, or enpresenting. He writes that the German employed by Heidegger
”carries both a visual and temporal sense, conveying the momentary ‘character’ of seeing.” In
line with Huebner’s rendering of Augenblick, I have retained, “moment of vision.” William
McNeill, The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2000), ixx.
81 Huebner describes the process of temporalizing in similar, albeit not identical terms,
when stating the following: “The past is finding himself already thrown-into-a-world. It is
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further developed as an authentic historical occurrence in the final section of
the essay when analyzing Huebner’s individual-world dialectic.
The Potential
Education

Implication

of

Ecstatic

Temporality

for

Due to an inauthentic understanding of time, educators orient the
curriculum and the learning experience contained therein toward the future,
which is conceived as knowable and determinate, creating an education
program wherein goals, aims, and purposes are posited in advance of the
authentic experience of education in its practical enactment, and toward which
students are then led. Such a strict product-process model for curriculum assumes
that it can specify the student’s future behavior because it is determinate and
thus predictable. In many instances, the student’s authentic possibilities are
defined in advance by educational professionals residing at an external and
temporal remove from the authentic unfolding of the student’s Being in the
processes of learning. For example, private foundations (Carnegie Corporation)
and accrediting testing agencies (ETS – Education Testing Service), situated at
a remove from the classroom, represent professional organizations that are in
charge of establishing the standards criteria for learning within educational
institutions. This expression of the inauthentic understanding of time covers
over and obscures the student’s genuine potentiality-for-Being. Whereas the
authentic understanding of temporality makes possible moments of resolute
openness wherein students choose to enact their authentic possibilities within a
learning environment facilitating the autonomous and self-directed revelation
and appropriation of their authentic possibilities for the enactment of their
Being.
Due to the inauthentic understanding of time, it is also possible for
educators to remain locked within a view to the present, which presupposes an
understanding of time where the past is gone and irretrievable and the future
has not yet arrived. This represents a form of presentism in education, i.e., the
current conception and inception of educational systems, institutions,
philosophies, and theories are conceived as existing “in time,” and since they
having-been that makes possible the projection of his potentiality. The present is the moment of
vision where Dasein, finding itself thrown into a situation (the past), projects its on potentiality
for being. Human life is not futural (my emphasis); nor is it past, but, rather, a present made up of a
past and future brought into the moment.” It must be noted that while Huebner certainly
remains very close to Heidegger’s original interpretation of ecstatic temporality, the remark
stating that we are not futural beings is inconsistent with what Heidegger indicates regarding the
primacy of the future ecstases in the care-structure and the authentic temporalizing of Dasein, for
the “future (ecstases) has a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality.”
Heidegger claims that although all modes of temporality are equiprimordial, their “modes of
temporalizing are different,” and to understand “primordial and authentic temporality” we must
note that it “temoralizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having
been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic
temporality is the future.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 378/329.

140

HUEBNER’S CRITICAL ENCOUNTER

are viewed only through the lens of the present, as making-present, they assume
eternal, indelible, and hypostatic characteristics, making the possibility for
authentic educational reform not only a daunting task, but a fatalistic
impossibility. This view of time remains blind to the crucial role that the past
plays, as heritage, in the historizing process of the student, which represents her
unique potentiality-for-Being as related her living past (and not merely a
historical past), which is always alive with the potential for growth and
transcendence, and is taken up into the authentic leaning experience, which is
the convergence of past and future in the moment of vision.
There are also models for curriculum-making that are situated in the present
while demonstrating an unquestioned reverence for the past and its educational
traditions, where change is viewed in terms of superficial improvements to a
grounding, foundational form that essentially remains unchallenged and
unchanged. These philosophies of education have firm roots in the thought of
the past and present. When conceiving an essential education for students, in
terms of a perennial or permanent curriculum, they are really imitating the past,
aping the past, recreating the past in the present without attempting to reassess
or reinterpret it in light of the students’ needs and wants, in terms of their
unique and futural potential-for-Being. This inauthentic view of education
embraces the status quo in curriculum, its content, pedagogical methodology,
and assessment strategies, and in no way represents the emancipatory move
beyond the current manner in which students, education, and society are
conceived.
Authentic Education and the Individual-World Dialectic:
Navigating the World as Temporal-Historical Being-in-theWorld as Being-with Others
Huebner’s concern with temporality is more complex than simply the
issue of educators, who are designing and implementing curriculum,
demonstrating a concern for the unfolding of time, or taking an interest in
history as a dynamic process, for these are concerns for historicist critique, and
this, of course, is not what Huebner is engaged in. Rather, on a primordial and
ontological level, Huebner is concerned with how we enact our authentic
existence in terms of the authentic unfolding of our historical being, and
beyond, he is concerned with how thinking education might be enhanced when
informed by the types of ontological-existential issues that are bound up with
the authentic enactment of students’/educators’ Being-in-the-world. According
to Huebner, “Curricular practice is not simply the concern for the constellation
of the educative environment,” it is the “concern for the human events that
occur within that environment.”82 To fully grasp the significance of the
individual-world dialectic, Huebner’s notion of educational “practice” must be
elucidated in terms of practical human activity, which dynamically embodies
the “essential temporal nature of man and points to the linkage of biography to
82
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history as a major educational concern.”83 Ultimately, it is Huebner’s notion of
the individual-world dialectic that serves as the organizing philosophical force for
reconceived curriculum design as inspired by thinking ecstatic temporality in
relation to education. Analyzing the individual-world dialectic will reveal the
kinship between Huebner’s philosophy of education and Heidegger’s thinking
on Dasein’s authentic historicality. Unpacking the following quotation by
Huebner reveals that Huebner’s individual-world dialectic springs from the
founding ground of Heidegger’s thinking on the basic constitution of
historicality, which includes, as I show, the notions of heritage, fate, and destiny as
related to our authentic historizing as communal beings.
The springs or sources of temporality do not reside in the
individual, but in conjunction between the individual and
other individuals, their material objects, and other ways of
thinking as they are objectified in symbol and operation.
Furthermore these springs or sources, although again not
residing in society, are nevertheless unveiled, maintained,
and protected by society. Thus man shapes the world, but
the world also shapes man. This is the dialectic process in
which cause is effect, and effect is cause. The world calls
forth new responses from the individual, who in turn calls
forth new responses from the world.84
I begin the analysis by clarifying Huebner’s notion of authentic
learning, which as opposed to learning grounded in abstraction and
generalization is a more primordial form of knowledge, or better,
understanding, through which students and educators interpret the world in
meaningful ways. Authentic learning for both Huebner and Heidegger
represents acts of understanding, and this form of insight, which is refined through
interpretation, will provide insight into the relational character of human
existence in terms of Huebner’s understanding of the individual-world dialectic,
which is at once the temporal-historical happening of our Being, comprising
the totality of the environmental design of the curriculum. For Heidegger,
understanding is know-how, by means of which we navigate our world, and
projection, or the manner in which Dasein, in its understanding, is always
already-out-ahead (ecstatic ‘standing-out’) of itself in its futural projection.
Dreyfus explains that understanding as know-how “makes possible skillful
coping,”85 and “relates some activities as doable, as making sense, and others as
not, or better, it does not recognize these other possibilities as possibilities at
all.”86 Understanding is directed toward accomplishing one or another task or

Ibid., 225.
Huebner, “Curriculum as a Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 138.
85 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, 18483
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activity, “coping with the available proceeds by pressing into possibilities,”87
and the manner in which Dasein’s “coping is organized by a for-the-sake-ofwhich,”88 and this for Heidegger is projection. Projection, it must be noted, is
always bound up with the entities with which Dasein deals, which of course
includes others, in terms of understanding and possibilities.
As stated, ‘know-how,’ as understanding for Huebner, is linked with
doing something with our understanding, but as opposed to the functional efficacy
of either pragmatic or scientific knowledge of the world, Huebner views
understanding as akin to existential thought, meditative thought, where doing
something with understanding might include “new exploring, more satisfying
expression, deeper and more meaningful encounters with others, greater
awareness of what and who [we are], and more ability to build and transform
the world.”89 Understanding, for both Huebner and Heidegger, is therefore
sharply contrasted with knowing as thematizing, for understanding “is not
cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically.”90 Rather, it is
linked to the “Being of the ‘there’ [of Dasein’s disclosedness],” and is
“primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-forBeing for the sake of which Dasein exists.”91 Through understanding Dasein
projects its for-the-sake-of-which, when it is open to futural possibilities that are on
the approach, which acquire meaning only in relation to the significance of the
structure of the for-the-sake-of-which, the towards-this, and the in-order-to of the
authentic “worldhood of its current world.”92 However, this for-the-sake-of-which is
not a determinative goal or end that Dasein posits in advance of its activities,
rather it is a way of understanding the meaning-schemata of Dasein’s Being-inthe-world, where it “throws before itself the possibility as possibility and lets it
be as such.”93 The system of relations Heidegger describes pertains to Dasein’s
Being-in-the-world as a whole. As related specifically to the process of
education envisioned by Huebner, the for-the-sake-of-which of learning represents
the groundless, or shifting, ground of the authentic curriculum, where
educational aims for student achievement are imminent within and emerge
from the unfolding of the learning. It must be noted that the for-the-sake-of-which
of education functions in terms of being projected within a community of
learners, for no student can ever have self-knowledge or authentic knowledge
of her world at a remove from interpersonal contact. Heidegger is clear on this
matter when writing, “The world of Dasein is a world-with [Mitwelt]. Being-in
is Being-with-others. Their Being-in-themselves-within-the-world is Dasein
with [Mitdasein].”94
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Interpretation for Heidegger, works to clarify what is ambiguously
given in understanding, and is never a “presuppositionless apprehending” of
things, rather all of our interpretations begin as something, in terms of Dasein’s
fore-having, fore-sight, and for-conception.95 We approach the things themselves,
guided in the first instance by both their uniqueness as well as a preconception
of what they might be, seeking to clarify our initial veiled and unclear
conceptions of them in order to eventually deepen and solidify our
understanding of them. This is accomplished through hermeneutic
interpretation, where our pre-understanding of things, as it were, allows us to
step into the circle, or spiral, of interpretation. When things, in relation to our
Being are understood, “we say that they have meaning [Sinn].”96 As we work to
clarify our understanding through interpretation we produce or construct
meaning, and as Heidegger claims, meaning represents “the ‘upon which’ of a
projection in terms of which something becomes interrogated as something; it
gets its structure from a fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.”97 This
form of making-meaning is precisely what Huebner has in mind when he talks of
hermeneutic activity as central to the dialectic between individuals, their
history, and world in terms of a confrontation, which he describes as the
rhythmic continuity and change of the individual’s understanding and
involvement with her world. For Huebner, hermeneutical activity is a
communal art, a “way of getting at pedagogical method and interpreting what
goes on in the classroom or other educational places.”98 Interpretation, as an
ongoing process, is always at work in education, and “whether by asking
questions, establishing written assignments, reading to the child, or
pronouncing words for him,” educators are “introducing him to traditions of
interpretations.”99
Huebner claims that the educational environment embodying “the
dialectical forms valued by society would require three aspects or
components.”100 It is possible to understand the three aspects of the individualworld dialectic transpiring within education, guided and directed by the design of
the curriculum, in terms of Heidegger’s understanding of authentic historicality
Ibid., 191-192/150.
Ibid., 192/151.
97 Ibid.
98 Huebner, “Towards a Remaking of Curriculum Language,” 47.
99 Ibid., 48. Although an analogy can be drawn between all forms of student learning
and the interpretive process, for example, Huebner talks of the “interpretation” involved in the
phonetic exercises of children during reading instruction, this would not amount to an instance
of authentic hermeneutic interpretation, for as Huebner makes explicit, the term “hermeneutic”
should not be substituted for “the words teaching method,” as there are a variety of pedagogical
methods at work within an authentic curriculum. In addition, it might be argued that Huebner
views hermeneutic interpretation in terms other than a formal methodology and rather as a
primordial way in which we are in the world, representative of our capacity and capability to
search out meaning and form an understanding of our lives. However, Huebner is clear that it is
within the context of hermeneutic interpretation alone that humans authentically come to know
themselves, each other, and are empowered through discourse to understand and change the
world and society of which they are a part
100 Huebner. “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 139.
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and the notions of heritage, fate, and destiny, the invariant structures that ground
Dasein’s historicizing, all of which correspond to the human’s temporal Being as
“Care”. Authentic education shows a concern for both the evolution of the
human being as well as the community, and Huebner envisions education as
the “manifestation of the historical process, meshing the unfolding biography
of the individual within the unfolding history of his society.”101 Huebner claims
that the ideal learning environment represents the unfolding of human
temporality as historicality through hermeneutic interpretation, and is an
environment that (1) calls forth a response from the student, (2) is reactive, and (3)
makes possible authentic moments of vision, “when the student and/or those
responsible him, project his potentiality-for-Being into the present, thus tying
together the future and the past into the present.”102 The educative process
conceived by Huebner should be understood in terms of Heidegger’s thinking
on Dasein’s resolute historical existence, where “resoluteness implies handing
oneself down by anticipation to the ‘there’ of the moment of vision; and this
handing down we call ‘fate’. This is also the ground for destiny, by which we
understand Dasein’s historizing in Being-with Others.”103
The curriculum as conceived by Huebner represents the authentic
dwelling of students and educators in the midst of a living tradition, wherein
they consider questions about what is valued, what traditions should be
preserved or altered, what should remain as part of the collective memory now
and in the future. This is not simply about teaching students about our past
and its traditions, not simply about deciding what knowledge from our past is
most valuable and therefore should be learned and passed along. Rather,
authentic education represents a collective decision about what aspects of our
tradition, or collective ethos, are in fact worthy to be taken up in “repetition”
and projected, as authentic possibility, into the future as destiny. In order to call
forth responses from students the living aspects of our heritage must be
embraced, they must be recognized as forming our authentic past, for in such a
view our heritage alone is worthy enough to demand and warrant a response, a
rejoinder that takes seriously the responsibility we have to our own unique
potentiality-for-Being. It is interesting to note that in Heidegger’s analysis of
authenticity, in terms of resolute, individuated Dasein’s Being-towards-death,
he refrains from including a discussion about the explicit factical possibilities
that are made available to the resolute Dasein for comportment. In fact,
Heidegger stresses that such an investigation “excludes even the existential
projection of the factical possibilities of existence,” and so he considers where
“in general Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects
itself,”104 for projecting itself on the possibility of death alone as possibility,
“gives only the totality and authenticity of one’s resoluteness.”105 It is in fact
from the past, as heritage, that Dasein’s factical possibilities, in terms of its
Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 139.
103 Heidegger, Being and Time, 438/386.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
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potentiality-for-Being, first arise, representing the so-called “content” of
authentic existence to which form is provided by Dasein through the
autonomous enactment of its historical Being.
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself,
discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing,
and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that
resoluteness, as thrown, takes over […] if everything
‘good’ is a heritage, and the character of ‘goodness’ lies in
making authentic existence possible, then the handing
down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness.106
Heritage, as authentic thrown having-been, is what demands a rejoinder
from Dasein, and Huebner refers to heritage as the students’ “collective
wealth,” and represent speech patterns, forms of dialogue, language of the
curriculum, structural forms of various disciplines, and our collective ethos, the
habituated behaviors and beliefs of a historical culture, along with “the social
customs shaping interacting patterns, and the man-made things that make up
much of the man’s world.”107 Within these aspects of heritage “we find the
stuff for our hermeneutic and world-building arts”108 and they inform the forehaving, fore-sight, and fore-conception that the student brings to the context of
interpretation, wherein memories of their collective existence are set within a
“caring collectivity in which individuals share memories and intentions,”109 and
through the process of learning, “form a bridge between self and other; a
linkage among past, present, and future; the vehicle by which individuals, in
community, arrive at mutual understanding in the conduct of their public
affairs.”110 The past becomes the means by which students project their own
potentiality-for-Being as historical, and the educational environment must be
designed with the understanding that the past is always present as the basis for
our futural projection. This relates to what Heidegger claims about heritage and
“the possibility that Dasein might choose its hero”111 from out of the myriad of
historical possibilities that the past has made available for potential
appropriation. “For this,” as Inwood writes, “Dasein must return to the past,
perhaps to its own birth, but more likely beyond. There are great philosophers,
generals, statesmen, artists, saints, and lovers whose deeds and works are part
of Dasein’s heritage.”112
In addition to calling forth a response from students, the educational
environment “must be reactive, or else the student must question it so that it

Ibid., 435/383.
Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for man’s Temporality,” 139.
108 Huebner, “Towards a Remaking of Curriculum Language,” 37.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Heidegger, Being and Time, 437/385.
112 Michael Inwood, Heidegger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 92.
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responds to him.”113 This relates directly to the unique possibilities that
manifest in a way in which our “accidental” and “provisional” possibilities are
“driven out” and our existence is pushed into its “finitude,” and at that instant,
we are “snatched back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer
themselves as closest,” and this brings us “into the simplicity of [our] fate
(Schicksal).”114 Dasein is aware of enacting only a limited number of
possibilities, and it understands that these possibilities are approaching from
out of the past as its living heritage. Fate, according to Heidegger, is
determinative of Dasein’s futural projection and the authentically “historical”
moment of vision. Fate is the manner in which Dasein opens the present,
enacting its existence temporally as it experiences its freedom towards its
authentic possibilities, and freedom arises from the limitations and finitude of
its existence, and is in turn defined by the burden of its heritage. Fate is the how
of comportment, the authentic enactment of Dasein’s existence as thrownprojection, as it draws possibilities from its heritage and in a decisive manner
chooses among the possibilities afforded by its past, and this is the reactive
aspect of the learning space. “Fate is the authentic resoluteness in which
Dasein holds itself free for death, in a possibility it has inherited and yet
chosen.”115 This is what Heidegger means by stating that our finite possibilities
are always drawn from heritage, and in terms of Huebner’s understanding of
the individual-world dialectic, it is the recognition that this reactive aspect of the
learning experience happens in terms of the reciprocal counter-striving
between the student and her world, for as indicated earlier by Huebner, the
student shapes the world and the world in turn shapes the student. This occurs
only within a curriculum design acknowledging temporality and historicality,
because the reactive aspect of authentic education hinges on the emergence of
the “past as part of the valued past brought into the present of the student.”116
Educators must facilitate the emergence and occurrence of moments of
vision, wherein student’s authentic possibilities for their Being manifest; they
Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for man’s Temporality,” 139.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 384/335.
115 Ibid., 435/385.
116 Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 139. It must be further
stressed that Huebner’s notion of “reactive” runs contrary to the notion of “reactive” found in
behaviorism and concept-empiricism, and this might be elucidated by attending to Grumet’s
distinction between the behaviorist conception of the human subject and the subject as
conceived by phenomenology and existentialism. The subject is not merely reactive to external
stimuli, which would reduce the human to a “tabula rasa upon which the world makes its marks, a
template of social conditioning.” The notion of reactive in phenomenological philosophies of
education denotes “discourse,” or the confrontational dialogue between individual and world
wherein the human is equipped to freely “interpret, repudiate, or reaffirm experience,” i.e.,
actively construct menaing. As Grumet argues, to delete discourse from the educational
experience would reduce “learning to a series of reactive, conditioned behaviors best described
as training,” and although this description is affirmed by the behaviorists, “it is rejected by
existentialist [and phenomenologal] philosophies in their acknowledgement of commitment and
human freedom.” Madeleine Grumet, “Existential and Phenomenological Foundations of
Autobiographical Methods, in Understanding curriculum as phenomenological and deconstructed text (New
York, NY: Teacher’s College Press, 1992), 23.
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must work with students in order to ready them, in moments of resolute
openness, to enact their authentic possibilities, moments where the
indeterminate future approaches to converge with their past, which is carried
into, thereby breaking open, the authentic present of the Situation, “thus tying
together the future and past in the present.”117 In light of the ground covered,
it is possible to conclude that an authentic education as conceived by Huebner
is one in which the design of the curriculum fosters the individual-world dialectic,
which unfolds by means of hermeneutic meaning-making, informed by the
student’s authentic potential-for-Being. Authentic education makes possible
the emergence of the student’s authentic possibilities for establishing her
historical grounding as destiny in the moment of vision; Through appropriation
she enacts her authentic way of being-in-the-world as Being-with Others. The
classroom is never merely a collection of individual and disconnected fates, as
it is guided in advance by the fact that human existence is authentically
communal. Rather, the classroom is a place of dwelling wherein “our fates have
already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same
world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities.”118 The design of the
classroom environment within an authentic view to education sets up the
solicitous context
where adults seek to influence the young, where the
young influence the adults, a place where the past is
presently used, interpreted, rethought, and reworked; a
place of not submitting to someone else’s powers and
accustomed ways but of negotiating for power in the
maintaining and reforming of the public world.119
Destiny, within the individual-world dialectic, must be conceived as the
ecumenical pursuit of authentic learning where the classroom represents an
originary community, wherein we dwell in learning with others. In this community,
students are beholden to the processes of education, as “each individual is
bound up in advance to something that binds and determines each individual
by exceeding them,”120 and this occurs within an atmosphere of solicitous care
that unfolds through the process of interpretive meaning-making. Here,
student and educator care for the communal archive of knowledge that is
developing within various learning experiences, which is bound up with care
for the both the student’s store of knowledge and unique cultural heritage as
related to the her own unique possibility for existence, which grows and
evolves within the flux, flow, and rhythmic dynamic of the unfolding of
education as a temporal-historical phenomenon. When learning authentically
with others, we share a like-minded sense of care for our common fate as
Ibid., 139.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 436/385.
119 Huebner, “Towards a Remaking of a Curriculum Language,” 52.
120 Martin Heidegger, Holderlin’s Hymns: ‘Germania and The Rhine, trans., William
McNeill (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 74.
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learners. Destiny is the authentic enactment of our potentiality-for-Being as
historical, when through communication and struggle we make and remake our
world as a people, and it culminates in the repetition (Wiederholen), or
appropriation, of a possibility from our past in a reinterpreted and renewed
form, and it is only in the moment of vision that this authentic appropriation
of our past is possible.
Repetition might be thought of as a dialogue with the past, or as
Inwood suggests that we commit to a discourse with the past and its heroes,
e.g., “Alexander or Plato makes certain suggestions”121 to us through their
exploits or written words, and we “make a rejoinder to them.”122 Ultimately,
through communal discourse as hermeneutic interpretation, repetition becomes
a legitimate possibility of our Being, and through developing and deepening
our interpretations of the world, which emerge through a confrontation with
the past and past-as-present, we are in the position to authentically choose to
choose ourselves through communal decision-making. Although we are beholden
to our past this does not necessarily require that we honor or maintain it,
further still it is not simply learning or memorizing our traditions, for this
would be inauthentic confrontation with the past. Rather, we are only truly
beholden to our heritage when we approach the past in order to see,
understand, and beyond, envision ways in which it might be reinterpreted in
light of our authentic potentiality-for-Being and taken up, through “repetition”
in an authentic mode of historical appropriation, which both Heidegger and
Huebner understand in terms of the human being’s authentic enactment of its
history through the process of historizing.
As this foregoing section indicates, Huebner’s philosophy of
curriculum is both phenomenological and ontological, and since it is
interpretive, it is also, in the tradition of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of
Being and Time, hermeneutic. The relevance of Huebner’s introduction of
phenomenology in education and curriculum studies as related to
contemporary Heidegger scholarship in education can be traced to the
philosophical development of such major educational theorists as Smith, Van
Manen, and most particularly, David Jardine, whose writings focus on
educational reform in terms of qualitative philosophical inquiry, which runs
counter to empirical and social research in education and pedagogy Much of
contemporary research, according to Jardine, views education as a practice
wherein the privilege of theory and method reduce the student’s authentic
(“lived”) social situation to “univocal terms that can be simply counted and
recounted,”123 whereas authentic interpretative research, as related specifically
to the hermeneutical project that we find in Huebner, attempts to tease out,
interpret, and understand the intangible “evocative given in all its tangled
ambiguity, to follow its evocations and entrails of sense and significance that

Inwood, Heidegger, 92.
Ibid., 92.
123 David Jardine, To Dwell with a Boundless Heart: Essays in Curriculum Theory,
Hermeneutics, and Ecological Imagination (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1998), 40-41.
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are wound up with it.”124 Thus, education cannot be authentically conceived as
reducible to a strict methodology or “set of rules that need to be simply applied
to an incident independently of the contribution that incident might have
regarding what needs to be said”125 in light of the practical conditions of the
lived experience of education, which proximally and for the most part,
structure and guide the interpretation’s unfolding.
Importantly, as related to Huebner’s invaluable contribution to
Heidegger studies in education, I have intimated within this paper a recent and
emerging theoretical framework for research within contemporary educational
scholarship in the post-structural movement to re-conceptualize the curriculum,
which harbors a wealth of untapped potential, namely, the understanding of
Being-in-the-world as unfolding through the attuned practice of “embodied”
interpretation, understanding, and discourse as related to the life-practice of
hermeneutics, or the “hermeneutics of facticity”. In Being and Time Heidegger
conceives the human being as it is always and already located within the world
in a “factical” manner: “Facticity,” as Heidegger reasons, “is a definite way of
Being,”126 and this implies that “an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-theworld in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’
with the Being of those entities which it uncovers within the world.”127
Heidegger’s foregoing description of “facticity,” as employed within Jardine’s
qualitative work on education, as it is filtered through Huebner’s philosophy of
curriculum, suggests that the philosophy of education and the interpretation
thereof must above all be performative: It must be lived and practiced in actions
that are inseparable from the embodied, lived events within which our
experiences of the world and others are inextricably grounded.
A philosophy as outlined embracing the “factical” unfolding of
education as a practical immersion in the world, located within specific settings,
bound up intimately with unique individuals, understands in advance that these
concrete situations of learning cannot be grasped or communicated exclusively
through rational, or calculative (“theoretical”) forms of knowing, for their
existential “truths” are beyond the purview of both analytic and empirical
thought. Thus, contemporary educational research should show concern for
the living process of education as a “kind of illuminating disclosing of life in
the explicit actualization [Vollzug] of the movement of factical life.”128 In
Risser’s analysis of the relationship between the hermeneutics of facticity and the
human community, his philosophical claims might be related directly to
Huebner’s authentic understanding of education as described in this essay.
Contemporary educational research would do well to “take its departure from

Ibid., 48.
Ibid.
126 Heidegger, Being and Time, 82/56.
127 Ibid.
128 James Risser, “Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Question of Community,” in
Interrogating the Tradition: Hermeneutics and the History of Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of
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factical life experience and always turn back to factical life experience,”129 and
avoid practices that the attempt to transcend lived, factical experience through
objective, abstract generalizations of students, educators, and the processes of
learning. As Risser is careful to point out, in terms that echo Jardine, the
hermeneutics of facticity is never reducible to a scheme or rigorous method (e.g.,
the scientific method in Dewey), for it is “neither exegesis nor an art of
interpretation as in Schleiermacher and Dilthey; rather it is simply the
operation of philosophy itself that catches hold of life in its activity.”130 With
this understanding, in light of the ground covered, it is Huebner who inspires
contemporary educational theorists to continue searching out the value in
Heidegger’s early philosophy as it might contribute to the betterment of our
educational practices.

The Potential Implication of the Individual-World
Dialectic for Education
Authentic education, conceived as unfolding within the individual-world
dialectic does not adopt the procedural method of establishing goals, aims, and
purposes of education in advance of learning experiences, as is consistent with
product-process curriculum design. Rather, it is possible to imagine, in line with
process-product models for curriculum, the goals and aims for learning and
authentic standards for education always already immanent as potential in the
authentic unfolding of the curriculum in progress, e.g., the for-the-sake-of-which
that education is concerned with is not a determinate, immutable goal posited
in advance of the learning. In line with the phenomenological-ontology of this
paper, we might imagine goals and aims emerging through a process of
hermeneutic interpretation, following a spiral structure, rather than a linear
design for curriculum-making, educators begin with a fore-conception, or presupposition, concerning goals and outcomes, but these goals and outcomes are
fluid and protean in nature, they change, evolve, develop and are reworked as
knowledge and understanding of the student’s needs, wants, desires, and
abilities are revealed and interpreted by the educator. Although the educational
aims for student achievement are set forth at the outset of the learning, they
are more akin to informed suggestions, path-marks for learning, and are always
subject to revision and elaboration as the educator deepens and clarifies her
understanding of that which emerges from the learning experience.
As follows from above, there are crucial ethical implications bound up
with authentic education concerned with the manner in which we dwell in
community with others. Since the environmental design of the curriculum is
grounded in the understanding of temporality and historicality, i.e., the
authentic heritage, fate, and destiny of educators and students, learning transpires
within an inclusive, multi-cultural environment, and beyond, depends for its
authenticity on educator’s embracing the inclusion of the language and cultural
129
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forms of knowledge that each student brings to the context of learning. The
notion of heritage as embodying our living past, the unique collective ethos of the
student’s given culture, our collective ethos as members of a state and nation,
the store of unique cultural possibilities that allow for the authentic projection
into our future as destiny, testifies that education must avoid leveling down or
excluding the diverse cultural histories and values of our students.
Understanding heritage as the legitimate founding ground for our future growth
and development should awaken educators to the necessity of transcending
unethical and inauthentic practices and policies that socially, culturally, and
linguistically marginalize students.
Authentic learning within the individual-world dialectic also embodies the
ethical aspects of social-based learning, where students learn from each other
and indeed teach each other in a variety of ways, and is concerned with the
respectful exchange of ideas in ways that demonstrate care, tolerance, and a
critical conscious awareness. The communal character of the classroom
includes the all-important concern for moral development and engenders
learning through a process of arduous and respectful discourse, which plays
out in the process of accepting, rejecting, refining, validating, and honing the
various interpretations that are offered up for debate in shared moments of
problem-solving, which stress self-development and group development
through communicative debate. There is recognition of the strengths and
weaknesses that are either beneficial or detrimental to the personal
development of the self and group. Educators and students work to arrive at
common, agreeable solutions to the problems they attempt to solve through a
process of critical debate, which is always rooted in the ever-changing needs of
our students and their historical reality, which represents an ever-renewed
ethical quest for knowledge, understanding, and meaning.
In addition to the student’s heritage, she also brings a vast store of
intellectual and emotional experience to the learning context, which holds vast
potential to make a contribution to ever-growing, ever-developing communal
archive of student knowledge. Meaning is constructed within the shared
horizon of “perspectives” through the unfolding hermeneutic and heuristic
activities wherein student’s interpretations are composed of clusters of
interpretations, and individual interpretations develop along with, and indeed
because of, those with whom the student participates within the process of
authentic learning. Thus, there is an all-important bridge constructed between
prior knowledge, which is valued as legitimately contributing to the learning,
and new knowledge. Authentic education also embraces alternative forms of
knowledge in the curriculum, e.g., human wisdom, meditative thought,
hermeneutic understanding, aesthetic insight, which allows educators and
students to approach ontological aspects of their existence in a philosophical
manner through a rigorous form of non-conceptual and non-systematic
thought, which avoids the “subjectivist” trap of dualism.131
131 It is possible to associate understanding, as an alternative form of “knowing” the
world, with a way of thinking that Huebner terms “human wisdom,” which is akin to meditative
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Concluding Remarks
Scientific instrumentalism in education, of which Huebner is critical, is
represented in the neural psychological-physiological research focused on what
teachers should know about how students learn. As indicated, Huebner views
education as becoming “overly dependent on scientific modes of thought for
shaping values and legitimizing actions,”132 and this affinity for scientific
thought is also present to teacher-training programs, where “future teachers are
exposed to the psychological and developmental knowledge of the child and
man to help develop knowledge of, attitudes toward, and skills for working
with students.”133 Linda Darling-Hammond claims that educators must have an
awareness about students’ learning and its implications for teaching knowledge and skills,
and this knowledge is gained by means of conducting scientific research in the
following areas: Research on how teachers and students learn; Research on
teacher learning and its affect on pedagogy and student outcomes; Research on
learning conditions and teachers effectiveness in structuring and influencing
learning; Research on brain development, language acquisition, and social
development.134 Huebner, arguing against privileging empirical research in
education, claims that the language “furthered and developed by the scientific
study of the child”135 and educator ignores the more humane and philosophical
issues of “the place of the adult in the child’s world, the politics of adult-child
relationships, the child’s participation in the building of public worlds, and the
art of interpretation about the meaning of life as people, children, and adults
live together.”136
Huebner is clear that authentic discourse on education reform cannot
begin until there is the serious consideration of “the individual, the society and
the culture or tradition.”137 In light of these aforementioned concerns, in
“Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” Huebner focuses specifically
on the need for educators to gain a basic “awareness of historicity,” which is
intimately bound up with “man’s temporality and the concern for it as the
focus of curricular action.”138 Huebner digs below the surface of the
curriculum as currently conceived, “penetrating the realities that the everyday
educator takes for granted,” and illuminates, through a phenomenological
thought, as opposed to calculative thought. What John Gray writes about Heidegger’s philosophy
might well apply to Huebner’s conception of rich, fecund, and deep contemplation within the
classroom, for the advance in thought that both of these philosophers seek is to “learn to think
non-conceptually and non-systematic yet with rigor and strictness about the nature of Being,”
within the overarching goal of avoiding “the subjectivity involved in separating human being and
Being, subject and object.” Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? Translator’s introduction, xxv.
132 Huebner, “New Modes of Man’s Relation to Man,” 87.
133 Ibid., 87.
134 Linda Darling-Hammond & Bransford, Preparing Teachers for a Changing World: What
Teachers Should Learn and Be able to Do (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), 1-39.
135 Huebner, “Toward a Remaking of Curriculum language,” 35.
136 Ibid., 35.
137 Ibid., 41.
138 Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 132.
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approach in thought and language, the ways the “educator has decided to live
in the world and what he sees as possible futures.”139 It is interesting to note
that in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, Heidegger concluded that Nietzsche
remained a metaphysician because he failed to transcend the conceptuallinguistic constraints of traditional metaphysics. This is why Heidegger required
a new and unique language to address such issues as the oblivion of Being in
philosophy; Huebner also seeks out a new and unique language with which to
begin, perhaps for the first time, to authentically approach the phenomenon of
education by means of new ways of speaking and thinking poetically, as
opposed to merely being “socialized into the existing institutions or the
language generated by them.”140
It is not about educators finding or inventing new words, resorting to
catch phrases, or producing new terms for antiquated educational theories.
Instead, what is required in the first instance is our awakening to the primordial
power of “essential” language. Huebner, writing on language and teaching,
speaks of the enduring nature of language in the Heideggerian spirit and seeks
to understand the poetic, originary naming power of language as it might relate
to inspiring authentic reforms in education. Language is not the equivalent of
expressing or verbalizing knowledge through propositions, it is not merely a
system of codes, signs, symbols, and signifiers, rather in its essence, “language
is neither expression nor an activity of man,”141 for language in its authentic
manifestation “speaks” through us in order to, by means of essential naming,
bring the “presence of what was previously uncalled into a nearness.”142
Indeed, this is how Huebner conceives language, which allows us to bring forth
what is concealed into the open by naming the world for the human being. In
tracing Huebner’s curriculum philosophy back to its origin or source, in
relating his language and concepts to a unique way of “naming” the truth of
our historical Being as related to our educational practices, I have tried to
demonstrate a way in which educators might benefit through understanding
Huebner’s critical encounter with Heidegger’s philosophy and draw inspiration
from a reconceived understanding of education so that they might feel
empowered to reconsider the ways in which they view students and themselves
in terms of their own potentiality-for-Being as grounded in their historical
realities, which hold the potential of offering unique possibilities for
transcendence and emancipation in educational reform.
Department of Philosophy, College of Dupage, United States of America
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